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Abstract
This paper examines how trade liberalization affects innovation, profits and welfare in a model of reciprocal
markets when firms pre-commit to research and development (R&D). We establish that the equilibrium is
not always unique and show that, with trade, R&D commitment leads to higher levels of innovation, lower
profits, higher consumer surplus and higher welfare than when R&D is chosen simultaneously to output lev-
els. Furthermore, if the effectiveness of R&D is sufficiently high, trade always yields higher welfare than
autarky, implying that R&D commitment may significantly enhance the welfare gains from trade
liberalization.
1. Introduction
In this paper we examine how trade liberalization affects innovation and welfare under
oligopoly when firms pre-commit to research and development (R&D). We are inter-
ested in the effects of R&D decisions of firms that behave strategically, effectively
making their R&D decisions prior to output decisions, hence affecting rival firms’ out-
puts. More specifically, we examine how firms may use innovation as a commitment
device to adopt an aggressive stance both in the domestic and the export market. In
fact, as the building of the necessary R&D capacity is not immediate, firms typically
need to make their R&D-investment decisions long term. Hence, in an environment
where strategic action is possible (i.e. in oligopoly), it is natural to model R&D invest-
ment as taking place before output decisions are made. In modeling R&D investment,
we follow the standard approach in models of strategic investment commitment, pio-
neered by d’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988), but, unlike the latter, we do so in an
open-economy set-up.1 More specifically, our paper builds on the reciprocal-markets
(RM) model of trade liberalization first developed by Brander (1981) and Brander
and Krugman (1983). The original RM model was set up to consider bilateral trade
liberalization between two identical countries, with firms competing in a Cournot man-
ner.2 The pioneers of the RM model demonstrated that intra-industry trade can occur
in equilibrium—even when goods are identical—and that welfare is U-shaped in trade
costs: starting at prohibitively high trade costs, a small fall in trade costs first reduces
welfare but, as trade costs fall further, welfare starts to increase.3 Importantly, there is
no investment in their model. Incorporating R&D investment into the RM model, we
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show that whether or not firms pre-commit to R&D, i.e. prior to the outputs being set
with the purpose of keeping the rival’s output down, matters significantly for the
effects of trade liberalization on innovation, consumer surplus, profits and, in particu-
lar, on welfare.
Clearly, if trade costs are sufficiently high, then—just as in the RM model without
investment—no trade can occur and the firms are monopolists in their domestic mar-
kets. We find that bilateral trade liberalization increases R&D spending and firm pro-
ductivity for all trade costs at which trade actually occurs and always benefits
consumers. We show that, as trade costs are lowered from the prohibitive level, we ini-
tially pass through a region of trade costs in which there are two stable equilibria. At
one of these, there is intra-industry trade and at the other, there is no trade. Further
liberalization leads to a disappearance of the no-trade equilibrium. When trade occurs,
profits are U-shaped in trade costs but always remain below the autarky profit level.
Our welfare results differ from those in the standard RM model in the sense that it is
not necessarily true that limited trade liberalization lowers welfare below the autarky
welfare level. In fact, we show that, if R&D is sufficiently effective in lowering produc-
tion costs, trade always yields higher welfare than autarky. The reason for this lies in
the fact that firms choose investment prior to outputs with the intention to strategically
manipulate their rivals’ behavior. We show that, although this strategic behavior is
mutually harmful to firms—the R&D game is a prisoner’s dilemma—it encourages
innovation, benefits consumers and is welfare improving in an overall sense. So, while
governments have an incentive to open up sectors in which firms are investing inten-
sively in R&D to foreign competition, they can at the same time expect a resistance to
such liberalization by those innovating firms.
The effects of trade liberalization on innovation and productivity have been dis-
cussed in a variety of settings. Among many other papers, notable examples are Melitz
(2003), Alcala and Ciccone (2004), Navas-Ruiz and Licandro (2011), Impulitti and
Licandro (2013) and Teteryatnikova (2016).4 There is also a sizeable literature that
discusses the effects of trade liberalization on profits and welfare (see, e.g. Brander,
1981; Brander and Krugman, 1983; Srinivasan et al., 1993; Goyal and Joshi, 2006).
More recently, Van Long et al. (2011) also incorporated R&D investment in a RM
model with trade liberalization but combined it with an extension of the Melitz (2003)
model with firm heterogeneity. Since they focus on the firm selection effect of trade
liberalization on R&D, they justifiably assume that output decisions are made under
asymmetric information and a firm’s R&D investment has no effect on the output
choice of rival firms. This assumption is equivalent to assuming that outputs and R&D
are determined simultaneously by each firm (including strategic commitment to R&D
in their model would make it intractable). Our paper is, however, the first to explore
the effects of trade liberalization on innovation, profits, consumer surplus and welfare
when firms pre-commit to R&D investment.5
In section 2, we develop a RM model with R&D investment. In section 3, we derive
firms’ innovation reaction functions and determine the equilibria of the game for dif-
ferent levels of trade costs. We subsequently discuss the effects of bilateral trade liber-
alization on R&D, consumer surplus, profits and overall welfare in section 4. Section 5
briefly elaborates on the effect of asymmetries on our results. Section 6 concludes.
2. The Model
Consider two countries, “Home” and “Foreign,” and two firms, 1 and 2. Firm 1 pro-
duces and invests in Home, and is fully owned by Home residents while firm 2
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produces and invests in Foreign and is Foreign owned. Firms produce homogeneous
goods6 and are identical in all other respects; they are therefore ex ante symmetric.
When firms compete in the same market, they do so as Cournot competitors. The
Home and the Foreign market are equal in size and segmented.7 Demand in Home
and Foreign is given by:
p5a2Q (1a)
and
p5a2Q; (1b)
respectively, with Q5q11q2 and Q5q11q

2; qi refers to output by firm i (i5 1,2)
intended for sale in Home and qi refers to output intended for Foreign. Variables
referring to the Foreign market are marked by an asterisk. If firms want to sell in their
rival’s domestic market, they export and face per unit trade costs t. We follow the orig-
inal RM model and assume that t is not a tariff. Instead, one can interpret the trade
cost as a non-tariff barrier or a transport cost.8
Each firm undertakes process R&D; hence, a firm’s R&D affects its marginal pro-
duction costs. Let ci5c2xi, where xi represents the reduction in marginal production
cost generated by the R&D firm i has undertaken. Henceforth, we will refer to xi as
the level of innovation by firm i. R&D expenditure is represented by ki, which is
defined as ki  x2i =2g; g can be interpreted as the effectiveness of R&D.9 To ensure an
interior solution, R&D expenditure ki is convex in xi. Profits of firm 1 and firm 2 are
respectively given by:
p15ðp2c1Þq11ðp2c12tÞq12k1 (2a)
and
p25ðp2c2Þq21ðp2c22tÞq22k2: (2b)
A country’s welfare is the sum of its consumer surplus (CS) and the profit of its own
firm. For the Home country, welfare is given by:
W5CS1p1 (3)
where CS5Q2=2:
3. The Game
Firms play a two-stage game, in which they simultaneously choose innovation levels, xi
(i5 1,2), in the first stage and subsequently choose outputs for each market in the sec-
ond stage. Solving the game by backward induction, we solve the output-setting stage
first before determining the optimal choice of R&D.
At the output stage, firms take R&D levels as given. When both firms are active in
both markets, respective Cournot–Nash outputs for firm 1 and firm 2 for the “Home”
country market are:
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qC15ðA1t12x12x2Þ=3 (4a)
and
qC25ðA22t12x22x1Þ=3; (4b)
while they produce:
qC1 5ðA22t12x12x2Þ=3 (5a)
and
qC2 5ðA1t12x22x1Þ=3 (5b)
for the “Foreign” market. For convenience we have defined A  a2c; superscript C
refers to Cournot–Nash outputs. At sufficiently high trade cost, firms do not trade and
autarky prevails (q25q150). Each firm is then a monopolist in its domestic market,
with Home monopoly output given by:
qM1 5ðA1x1Þ=2 (6)
with superscript M indicating monopoly.
We distinguish between four possible export status combinations: two-way trade,
(E,E), one-way trade with firm 1 exporting while firm 2 does not, (E,0), one-way trade
with firm 2 exporting while firm 1 does not, (0,E), and autarky, (0,0).
Innovation with R&D Commitment
As a first step to considering the different possible equilibria in the next subsection,
we derive a firm’s innovation best response function under the different regimes,
(E,E), (0,E), (E,0) and (0,0). For expositional purposes and without loss of generality,
we will adopt the perspective of firm 1. The best response function for firm 2 is derived
analogously.
When both firms export to each other’s domestic market, firm 1’s first-order condi-
tion for innovation is given by:
dp1
dx1
5
@p1
@x1
1
@p1
@q2
@qC2
@x1
1
@p1
@q2
@qC2
@x1
50: (7)
The second and third terms on the right-hand side of expression (7) are both positive
and capture the effect of strategic investment commitment in the Home and Foreign
markets, respectively.10 Expression (7) can be rewritten as ð4=3Þðq11q1Þ2x1=g50,
implying:
x15ð4=3Þgðq11q1Þ: (8)
Substituting for optimally chosen output levels in expression (8), firm 1’s best response
function, denoted by REE1 ðx2Þ, is:11
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REE1 ðx2Þ5
ð4=9Þð2A2tÞ2ð8=9Þx2
12ð16=9Þg g: (9)
We now turn to firm 1’s innovation best response function when there is only one-way
trade.12 When firm 1 does not export (q150) and faces competition in its domestic
market from firm 2 (q1 and q2 are given by expressions (4a) and (4b), respectively),
the first-order condition for x1 is:
dp1
dx1
5
@p1
@x1
1
@p1
@q2
@qC2
@x1
50: (10)
The second term on the right-hand side of expression (10) is positive and captures the
effect of strategic investment commitment in the home market where the firm faces
competition from the rival firm. Firm 1’s best response function, now denoted by
R0E1 ðx2Þ, where, here and henceforth, the first superscript refers to firm 1’s exporting
status, while the second refers to firm 2’s—thus, the superscript 0E indicates that firm
1 is not exporting while firm 2 is exporting—is given by:
R0E1 ðx2Þ5
ð4=9Þ½ðA1tÞ2x2
12ð8=9Þg g: (11)
When firm 1 exports to and competes in Foreign with firm 2, but does not face any
competition from firm 2 in its domestic market (q250, qC1 and q
C
2 are given by
expressions (5a) and (5b), respectively, while qM1 is given by (6)), the first-order condi-
tion for x1 is:
dp1
dx1
5
@p1
@x1
1
@p1
@q2
@qC2
@x1
50: (12)
Now, the best response for firm 1 is:
RE01 ðx2Þ5
ð17=18ÞA2ð8=9Þt2ð4=9Þx2
12ð25=18Þg g: (13)
Finally, in autarky, investment is simply chosen to minimize total costs given output.
Profit maximization implies:
x15gq1: (14)
So, when in autarky, firms’ innovation levels are different from those chosen when
trade prevails (see expression (8)). With trade, firms can expect to sell more as they
have access to a wider market, which tends to raise the return on investment. Also,
when firms compete on the same markets with each other, R&D is chosen more
aggressively than in autarky to affect rival outputs: firms choose more innovation per
unit of output when they face a rival firm in head-to-head competition than they do in
the absence of trade (compare the ratios of innovation with output in (8) and (14)).
From expressions (6) and (14), the innovation level chosen by firm 1 in autarky is
given by:
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x001 5
g
22g
A; (15)
where we use superscript 00 to indicate that neither firm exports (autarky).
Equilibrium Outcomes with R&D Commitment
In this subsection we derive the equilibrium innovation and trading outcomes at differ-
ent levels of trade costs. Before doing this we consider two symmetric candidate equili-
bria. Clearly, at high enough trade costs the countries will be in autarky. For low
enough trade costs, given ex ante symmetry between firms, symmetric two-way trade is
a clear candidate for an equilibrium. We now fully characterize these two symmetric
candidate equilibria, autarky and two-way trade, and subsequently determine the
range of trade costs for which each of these is an equilibrium outcome.
When autarky prevails, firms’ innovation levels are given by expression (15). Use of
(15) in expression (6) gives the autarky output level:
q001 5
A
22g
: (16)
With two-way trade, the symmetric equilibrium investment level is obtained from (9)
and the corresponding reaction function for firm 2, and is given by:
xEEi 5
ð4=9Þgð2A2tÞ
12ð8=9Þg ; i5 1; 2 (17)
Use of this in the expression for outputs (expressions (4a)–(5b)) yields:
qEE1 5q
EE
2 5
A1tð12ð4=3ÞgÞ
32ð8=3Þg (18a)
and
qEE2 5q
EE
1 5
A2tð22ð4=3ÞgÞ
32ð8=3Þg : (18b)
From expression (18b), it is clear that symmetric (E,E) cannot be an equilibrium for
t > t^5A=½22ð4=3Þg. However, this does not imply that symmetric autarky, (0,0), can-
not be an equilibrium below t^. In fact, a trade cost level of t < ~t5A=ð22gÞ is sufficient
to rule out the symmetric autarkic equilibrium. If R&D is at the symmetric autarkic
level given in (15), firms would actually export for t < ~t. In other words, substituting
x5x5gA=ð22gÞ into (4b) and (5a) at t < ~t yields positive exports. Hence, a subgame
perfect equilibrium with R&D given in (15) can be ruled out for t < ~t. We will refer to
trade costs in the interval ~t; t^½  as “high,” trade costs above t^ as “prohibitive” and trade
costs below ~t as “low.”
We first illustrate the equilibrium outcomes for t 2 ~t; t^½ , that is, for the range of
trade costs over which we cannot a priori exclude either trade or autarky. This particu-
lar region of trade costs is the most complex one in the sense that the reaction func-
tions needed to determine the equilibria will cross all the different trading regimes.
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We explain the best response functions and equilibrium outcomes diagrammatically
using Figures 1 and 2 while the technical details are relegated to the Appendix.
In Figure 1a, to the left of the q150 locus, Home and Foreign R&D-level combina-
tions are incompatible with Home exports and hence q150. Similarly, below the q250
locus, Foreign exports are zero. So, the two zero-export loci divide the (x1,x2) space up
in four areas. In Figure 1b, firm 1’s innovation best response function is illustrated in
Figure 1. Firm 1’s Reaction Function in (x1,x2)-space (~t < t < t^): (a) Trading
Regimes; (b) Innovation Reaction Function
Figure 2. Equilibria for High, Prohibitive and Low Trade Costs
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bold. It is made up of different sections depending on the trading regime. Each of the
individual sections were discussed in the previous subsection with the exception of the
upward sloping portion of the home best response function that coincides with the
q250 locus. Along this portion of the best response function, firm 1’s R&D is chosen
to reduce firm 2’s exports to exactly zero. We will refer to this as “export deterrence”
(more details are provided in the Appendix).
Figure 2a depicts both firms’ innovation reaction functions, where firm 2’s best
response function—derived in an analogous way and completely symmetric—is
depicted by the bold dashed kinked line. There are three equilibria. The equilibrium
at point O is stable and implies autarky; the autarky innovation level for each firm is
given by expression (15). The equilibrium at point E is also stable and involves two-
way trade; the two-way trade equilibrium level of innovation for each firm is given by
expression (17) above (see the Appendix for a brief discussion of stability).
The equilibrium at point U is unstable; at U, each firm produces for its domestic
market only and chooses its R&D to keep its rival’s exports equal to zero. Following
standard practice in the oligopoly games literature, we will restrict attention to the sta-
ble equilibria. Next, we examine what happens at trade costs outside the ~t; t^½  interval.
When trade costs increase, area 3 in Figure 1a expands at the expense of area 1. In
fact, for t > t^, the two-way trade equilibrium has now disappeared (as has the unstable
equilibrium). This case is depicted in Figure 2b; the reaction functions intersect only
once (at point O); now, autarky is the unique equilibrium.
If, instead, the trade costs fall below ~t, the autarky equilibrium vanishes and, with it,
the unstable equilibrium. Figure 2c shows an example of what the innovation reaction
functions look like in that case. They only intersect once (at point E); only the two-
way trade equilibrium remains. The following proposition summarizes the equilibrium
outcomes at different levels of trade costs.
PROPOSITION 1. When firms commit to R&D levels prior to choosing outputs in a
reciprocal-markets setting, (i) two-way trade is the unique equilibrium for t < ~t; (ii)
autarky is the unique equilibrium for t > t^ ; (iii) there are three equilibria when the
trade cost lies between ~t and t^ (~t  t  t^): two-way trade, reciprocal export deter-
rence and autarky.
PROOF. See Appendix. w
In words, as countries first liberalize trade and as t falls below t^ but remains above ~t,
they enter a region in which there are two stable equilibria (see Proposition 1): coun-
tries will either remain in autarky, or start to engage in two-way trade. Only when
trade liberalization is sufficiently drastic (i.e. t < ~t) will two-way trade be guaranteed.
In short, the path of trade liberalization is not unique. While a limited degree of trade
liberalization may generate trade between the countries involved, it does not guaran-
tee it. Instead, the integrating countries may be “trapped” in autarky until a more radi-
cal degree of trade liberalization is attained.
Equilibrium Outcomes in the Simultaneous-move Game
In our model firms commit to their R&D level in stage one and then choose outputs
in the second stage. Hence, R&D is chosen “strategically” to affect rival outputs. To
see how important this feature of the model is for the welfare benefits of trade liberali-
zation, we will later compare our results with those obtained in the hypothetical alter-
native in which R&D and outputs are chosen simultaneously. In that hypothetical
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case, which we will henceforth refer to as the simultaneous-move (“non-strategic”)
game, firms cannot use their investments to manipulate rivals strategically. Unlike in
our model with R&D commitment—and even when trading—firms now simply set
investment levels to minimize costs, or:
x15gðq11q1Þ: (19)
Compared with autarky (expression (14)), firms invest more (as they produce for the
export market as well), but their innovation-to-output ratio is the same as in autarky; in
short, investment is chosen less aggressively than when firms pre-commit to R&D invest-
ment, simply because, when investment is chosen simultaneously to output, firms cannot
strategically manipulate rival output. So, substituting for outputs in (19), we obtain:
ðxEE1 ÞS5
ð1=3Þgð2A2tÞ
12ð2=3Þg (20)
where S refers to the simultaneous-move game.
Also, in the hypothetical game, it is straightforward to show that there is only one
threshold, t05A=ð22gÞ, above which autarky is the unique equilibrium and below
which the trading equilibrium is unique (note that t05~t). This means that, unlike in our
full model with strategic commitment to investment, there is no region with multiple
equilibria in the simultaneous-move game.
4. Effects of Bilateral Trade Liberalization
As we have seen above, given that the countries are symmetric and the bilateral trade
liberalization takes a symmetric form, the equilibria are always symmetric. We can
therefore focus on the effects of trade liberalization on Home as the effects on Foreign
are identical. We investigate how innovation, profits, consumer surplus and welfare
are affected as trade costs change. We compare our results with the simultaneous-
move game (at given levels of t and g) and summarize the results in Table 1 (for the
derivations underlying the results in Table 1, see the Appendix).
Table 1. Innovation, Profits, Consumer Surplus and Welfare with Two-way Trade: Compar-
ing the Game with R&D Commitment with the Simultaneous-moves Benchmark
Game with R&D
commitment
Simultaneous-
moves (SM) game
Result 1:
Innovation is higher with R&D commitment
than in the SM game
xEE > ðxEEÞS
Result 2:
Profits are lower with R&D commitment
than in the SM game
pEE < ðpEEÞS
Result 3:
Consumer surplus is higher with R&D
commitment than in the SM game
CSEE > ðCSEEÞS
Result 4:
Welfare is higher with R&D commitment
than in the SM game
WEE > ðWEEÞS
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Innovation
Figure 3a depicts the level of innovation (captured by the cost reduction) xi, with
R&D pre-commitment as a function of trade costs. The solid curve xEEi represents
innovation with two-way trade, x00i is innovation under autarky and the dashed curve
xDDi depicts innovation with mutual export deterrence.
When engaged in trade, firms’ innovation levels in our model are higher at each
level of trade costs than the innovation levels in the simultaneous-move game
(depicted in Figure 3b). This is stated in Table 1 as Result 1. In both figures, the cost
reduction is linear in the trade cost when the firm is trading, with lower t leading to
more innovation. However, since firms choose R&D more aggressively when they pre-
commit to it, innovation is higher than in the simultaneous-move game. This also
explains why, for t 2 ~t; t^½  in Figure 3a, there is, at given t, a gap between the innova-
tion function xEEðtÞ and x00. By contrast, there is no gap between the innovation func-
tion ðxEEðtÞÞS and x00 (at given t) in Figure 3b and no region with multiple equilibria.
Profits
Figure 4a represents how trade affects firms’ profits when firms pre-commit to R&D
and hence choose their investment strategically. As depicted in the figure, there is a
discrete fall in profits when firms start to trade. This is not the case in the
simultaneous-move game (see Figure 4b).13 In fact, when firms pre-commit to R&D,
the trade equilibrium represents a prisoner’s dilemma outcome in terms of profits.
Figure 3. Innovation Under Trade Liberalization: (a) With R&D Commitment;
(b) Simultaneous-moves Benchmark
Figure 4. Profits Under Trade Liberalization: (a) With R&D Commitment;
(b) Simultaneous-moves Benchmark
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Thus, when trading, profits in our model are lower at each level of trade costs than
profits in the simultaneous-move game. This is stated in Table 1 as Result 2.
Profits are, both in our model with strategic pre-commitment to R&D and in the
simultaneous-move game, U-shaped in trade cost and higher in autarky than under
completely free trade. In the neighborhood of free trade, the trade cost works like a
tax, reducing the firms’ profits. However, when trade costs are nearly prohibitive, they,
although reducing profits on export sales, serve to protect the now relatively much
more important own market profits from import competition. Hence, in this region
profits increase in trade costs.
Consumer Surplus
To see how trade affects consumers when firms set R&D before outputs, we
examine how trade costs affect consumer surplus (see Figure 5a). Consumption
of the imperfectly competitive good increases for two reasons as trade is liberal-
ized. First, total output increases at given R&D levels owing to the fall in the
level of the trade costs. Second, the increase in R&D resulting from trade liber-
alization leads to a further increase in output. The net result is that trade liberal-
ization reduces the price of the imperfectly competitive good and raises
consumer surplus. Note that the price is always lower and the consumers are
better off under trade than they are under autarky, no matter how small the vol-
ume of trade.
Importantly, at given t, trade will always result in lower prices and thus higher con-
sumer surplus, when firms pre-commit to R&D than in the simultaneous-move game
(Result 3 in Table 1), where the latter is depicted in Figure 5b.
Welfare
We calculate welfare when firms set R&D before outputs in the two stable equilibria,
autarky and two-way trade. Using expressions (15) and (16) into the expression for
welfare (3) yields the welfare level in autarky, which—with symmetry—is equal to:
W005
32g
2
 
A
22g
 2
: (21)
Figure 5. Consumer Surplus Under Trade Liberalization: (a) With R&D Commit-
ment; (b) Simultaneous-moves Benchmark
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We will use the welfare level in autarky as a reference point for calculating the welfare
gains from trade liberalization.
Under two-way trade, maximized Home profits can be written as pEE1 5ðqEE1 Þ21
ðqEE1 Þ22kEE1 with kEE1 5 ðx
EE
1
Þ2
2g and x
EE
1 5ð4=3ÞgðqEE1 1qEE1 Þ from the first-order condi-
tion for optimal R&D choice. We use (3) to write the expression for welfare under
two-way trade as WEE1 5W
EE
2 5½ð1=2Þ2ð8=9ÞgðQEEÞ21ðqEE1 Þ21ðqEE2 Þ2, where we have
made use of symmetry between firms and markets to write the welfare function as a
function of Home market outputs alone. Substituting for the expressions for outputs
yields:
WEEðtÞ5 1
928g
f4AðA2tÞ1ð1=2Þð1128gÞt2g: (22)
Figures 6a and 6b represent how trade costs affect welfare when firms pre-commit to
investment before setting output levels. We see that welfare is higher under free trade
(t5 0) than autarky. Welfare as a function of trade costs inherits the property of being
U-shaped from the profit function and it reaches a minimum at a level of trade costs
that we refer to as t
^
.
PROPOSITION 2. When firms commit to R&D levels prior to choosing outputs in a
reciprocal-markets setting, welfare in the trading equilibrium reaches a minimum at
t
^
, with t
^
increasing in the degree of R&D effectiveness (g).
PROOF. From (22) it is straightforward to verify that WEEðtÞ is a convex function.
WEEðtÞ reaches a minimum at t^ , with dWEEð t^ Þ=dt52 4A2ð1128gÞt928g ; this implies
t
^
5 4A1128g. Clearly, dt
^
=dg > 0. w
Proposition 2 shows that the U-shaped feature of the welfare function, as obtained
in Brander and Krugman (1983), is preserved in our model regardless of the effective-
ness of R&D.
So, how does welfare in the game with R&D pre-commitment compare with welfare
in the game in which firms choose R&D simultaneously to outputs? Figure 6c depicts
welfare in the simultaneous-move game for different levels of trade costs: in this game
a small reduction in trade costs from the prohibitive level always results in welfare fall-
ing below the autarky level.
PROPOSITION 3. When R&D and outputs are chosen simultaneously in a reciprocal-
markets setting, there always exist levels of trade costs at which welfare with trade is
below its autarky level.
PROOF. Welfare with trade in the simultaneous-move game is given by expression
(A8) in the Appendix at r51. It is U-shaped in trade costs with a minimum at
t
^S5 2Að22gÞ
11213g14g2, where 0 < t
^S < t0. At t
^S, welfare is ðWEEÞS5 2A2ð22gÞ
11213g14g2. Comparing
this and expression (21) it is straightforward to show that the minimum level of
ðWEEÞS is strictly smaller than the autarky welfare level for all permitted values
of g. w
When firms commit to R&D before setting output, welfare is higher than welfare in
the simultaneous-move game (Result 4 in Table 1). Note that in both the game with
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R&D pre-commitment and the simultaneous-move game, it remains true that—as in
the original RM model—at high levels of trade costs, a small reduction in t can lead to
a fall in welfare.
Importantly, when the trade cost is high enough for autarky and trade to co-exist as
equilibrium outcomes (i.e. for t 2 ~t; t^½ ) in the game with R&D pre-commitment, the
trading equilibrium always yields higher welfare (see Figures 6a and b). This is stated
in Proposition 4.
PROPOSITION 4. When firms commit to R&D levels prior to choosing outputs in a
reciprocal-markets setting, welfare in the trading equilibrium is always higher than
in autarky when the trade cost lies between ~tand t^ (~t  t  t^).
PROOF. The proof is broken down into three steps. We first show that WEE > W00 at
t5~t. Subsequently, we show dWEE=dt > 0 for t > t
^
. Finally, ~t > t
^
is shown.
i. The use of ~t5A=ð22gÞ in expression (22) yields WEEð~tÞ5
1
928g 4A
224 A
2
22g1
11
2 24g
 
A2
ð22gÞ2
h i
. Welfare in autarky is given by (21). Given
these expressions for WEEð~tÞ and W00, WEEð~tÞ > W00 follows.
ii. We have dWEEðtÞ=dt5 1128g928g ðt2 t
^ Þ, hence WEE monotonically increases in
t ðdWEE=dt > 0Þ for t > t^ with t^ 54A=ð1128gÞ (see proof of Proposition 2).
iii. Since ~t5 A22g >
4A
1128g5 t
^
, we have WEEðtÞ > W00 for ~t  t  t^.
w
Figure 6. Welfare Under Trade Liberalization: (a) With R&D Commitment—High
g; (b) With R&D Commitment—Low g; (c) Simultaneous-moves Benchmark
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Firms’ strategic aggressiveness in choosing R&D when facing a rival firm in head-
to-head competition increases in g, the relative effectiveness of R&D. While this
reduces a firm’s profit below the autarky profit level (see Figure 4a), it raises consumer
surplus above the autarky level (see Figure 5a) and it does so by more if the relative
effectiveness of R&D is higher. As a result, a vertical gap opens up between the WEE
and the W00 loci (see Figures 6a and 6b). When the relative effectiveness of R&D is
very small, this gap is not very significant and the minimum of the WEE locus still lies
below W00. As g rises a threshold is eventually passed whereby the WEE is everywhere
higher than that of W00 and welfare in the trading equilibrium exceeds welfare under
autarky for all trade costs. This case is depicted in Figure 6a. As will be formally stated
in Proposition 5, when the effectiveness of R&D (g) is sufficiently high, welfare with
trade—no matter how limited that trade is—is higher than in autarky. It is precisely
the fact that firms pre-commit strategically to R&D and hence choose a level of R&D
above the level that minimizes costs that allows for the possibility that the trading
equilibrium guarantees higher welfare than autarky. Evidently, when R&D effective-
ness is low, welfare with trade can fall below the level under autarky. This is illustrated
in Figure 6b.
PROPOSITION 5. When firms commit to R&D levels prior to choosing outputs in a
reciprocal-markets setting, welfare in the trading equilibrium exceeds welfare under
autarky for all trade costs, provided that the degree of R&D effectiveness g is suffi-
ciently high.
PROOF. Since WEE reaches a minimum at t5 t
^
, WEE > W00 8 t, if WEEð t^ Þ > W00.
We can make use of (21) and (22) to show that this condition implies
4AðA2 t^Þ1ð1=2Þð1128gÞ t^
2
928g >
32g
2ð22gÞ2 A
2, using t
^
54A=ð1128gÞ. This condition simplifies to
4A2
1128g >
32g
2ð22gÞ2 A
2, which further reduces to g > 1=3. w
So, pre-commitment to R&D investment in the trading equilibrium, combined with
a sufficiently high degree of R&D effectiveness, will in fact ensure that trade is socially
superior to autarky for every degree of trade liberalization. Without such pre-
commitment—i.e. in the hypothetical simultaneous-move game—even a high degree
of R&D effectiveness cannot prevent welfare from falling below the autarky level for
some levels of trade liberalization.
5. Asymmetries
Although we focused here on a symmetric set-up, it is straightforward to use our
framework to examine asymmetries, such as market size asymmetry and asymmetric
trade liberalization. First, consider trade liberalization between countries with signifi-
cantly different market sizes. In that case, as trade costs fall from prohibitively high
levels, firms from the larger-sized countries would start exporting to the smaller-sized
market before (i.e. at higher trade costs than) their counterparts from the smaller-
sized country would. Furthermore, firms from the smaller-sized country would be the
ones to gain most when trade costs vanish altogether as they would gain equal access
to the larger market, and would hence be expected to support policy initiatives involv-
ing complete trade liberalization. Firms from larger-sized economies, in a position to
exploit the advantage of a relatively large home market, would tend to gain most from
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partial trade liberalization programmes with “intermediate” trade costs and would
therefore be more likely to oppose radical trade liberalization schemes.
Second, in our model, trade costs are symmetric and are reduced in a symmetric
way to capture bilateral trade liberalization. However, there are clearly many asym-
metric trade cost cases; these would give the firm facing the lower trade cost a cost
advantage that would in many respects be similar to the case in which firms have dif-
ferent firm-specific production or investment costs. For instance, assume only the
Home country liberalizes trade. Starting from autarky, we briefly mention what hap-
pens if the Home country were to gradually lower trade costs unilaterally. To keep
matters simple, assume throughout that there is no export from Home to Foreign. As
trade costs start to fall, we first obtain the unique equilibrium in which the Home firm
deters exports of the Foreign firm from its Home market. To do so, the Home firm
chooses a higher investment in innovation than in unthreatened autarky, which implies
that domestic output and consumer surplus will be higher too. This also leads to an
increase in Home welfare despite the fact that no actual trade takes place. Thus, even
without actual trade occurring, the threat of import competition raises domestic inno-
vation and welfare. This will continue to be the case as the trade cost falls further until
it reaches a threshold at which Foreign imports will no longer be deterred. From then
on, the equilibrium will involve trade with the Foreign firm exporting to Home. The
Home firm, which now loses market share, invests less, while the Foreign firm expands
its investment. Consumer surplus continues to rise but Home firm profits fall as the
trade cost falls. Welfare falls below the level under incipient trade and soon falls below
the autarky level.14 Thus, we find that the free trade welfare level in the Home country
under unilateral liberalization is lower than its welfare under autarky. There is an
exception to this. If the relative effectiveness of investment is high enough, then wel-
fare is higher at free trade than under autarky; however, this only occurs when the
Home firm is driven from the market altogether leaving the Foreign firm as a global
monopolist.15
6. Conclusion
In this paper we have developed a reciprocal-markets model with international R&D
intensive firms. In contrast to previous work on trade liberalization with R&D invest-
ment in a RM set-up, we assume firms use R&D to commit to higher output and thus
maintain and increase market share, both to help them penetrate into foreign markets
and defend their market share at home from rivals. We examined how trade liberaliza-
tion affects innovation, profits and welfare. We found that, unlike in the original RM
model without R&D investment (Brander and Krugman, 1983) and unlike in a RM
model with R&D investment that is chosen simultaneously to outputs rather than
prior to it, there exists a range of trade costs for which there are two stable equilibria:
in one of the equilibria firms do not export, while there is intra-industry trade in the
other. This implies that the path of trade liberalization is not unique. Compared with
the autarky equilibrium, the trade equilibrium involves higher R&D spending and
innovation. While this is also true in a game in which R&D and outputs are chosen
simultaneously, the difference between the innovation levels with trade and in autarky
is even larger with R&D pre-commitment. This is due to the fact that firms commit to
R&D to manipulate rival outputs and, as a consequence, choose R&D investment
above the level that minimizes costs. This helps to raise overall welfare when trade is
opened up. However, it hurts the firms themselves who are caught up in a prisoner’s
dilemma. We showed that it is precisely because of this strategic investment behavior
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that, if R&D investment is sufficiently effective, trade will yield higher welfare than
autarky at any level of non-prohibitive trade costs. This result stands out against the
welfare effects of trade liberalization in both the original RM model and a RM frame-
work with firms choosing their R&D investment simultaneously to outputs; in those
set-ups welfare with trade always falls below the autarky welfare level at some inter-
mediate levels of trade costs.
Appendix
The Home Firm’s Best Response Function when t‰ ~t; t^½ 
When t 2 ~t; t^½ , the best response crosses all trading regimes. We show how the
regime-specific segments (see derivations in the first subsection of section 3) of the
innovation best response function fit together. To demarcate the trading regimes,
Figure 1a depicts the zero-export loci for firm 1 and firm 2, respectively labeled by
q150 and q250. From expression (5a), the non-negative export constraint for firm
1 is binding when:
A22t12x12x250: (A1)
Similarly, the non-negative export constraint for firm 2 is binding when:
A22t12x22x150 (A2)
from expression (4b). In Figure 1a, to the left of the q150 locus, Home and For-
eign R&D-level combinations are incompatible with Home exports and hence
q150. Similarly, below the q250 locus, q250. So, the two zero-export loci divide
the (x1,x2) space up in four areas and intersect at innovation levels x15x252t2A.
For x2 > x2 in Figure 1b firm 1 does not export but firm 2 does and hence firm
1’s best response to x2 is R
0E
1 ðx2Þ (expression (11)). (The expression for x2 and
other thresholds associated with Figure 1b are reported in Table A1.) For
x2 2 x2; x2½ , two-way trade, (E,E), prevails, hence REE1 ðx2Þ (expression (9)) is firm
1’s best response function in that range. For x2 values between x2 and x2, firm 1
chooses R&D to reduce firm 2’s imports to exactly zero. Using (A2), this export
deterring portion of firm 1’s reaction function can be written as:
R1ðx2Þjq2505A22t12x2: (A3)
For these x2 values firm 1 does choose R&D “strategically.” However, because firm
2’s non-negative export constraint binds, it places a limit on firm 1’s strategic
Table A1. Firm 1’s Innovation Best Response Function
x2-range Firm 1’s best response
x2 > x 2 R
0E
1 ðx2Þ
x2  x2  x 2 REE1 ðx2Þ
x
2
< x2 < x2 R1ðx2Þjq250
x
2
 x2  x2 x001
x2 < x
2
RE01 ðx2Þ
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investment (since rival exports can never be induced to turn negative). For
x2 2 ½x
2
; x
2
 in Figure 1b firm 1 will choose the autarky x2 level as its best response.
For x2 < x
2
, firm 1 exports to Foreign, but firm 2 remains active only in its own
domestic market (area 4 of Figure 1a), hence firm 1’s best response is RE01 ðx2Þ
(expression (13)).
Stability of Equilibria
For t 2 ~t; t^½ , there are three equilibria. Following standard analysis we will focus on
stable equilibria. A reaction function equilibrium is stable if j@r1ðx2Þ=@x2jj@r2ðx1Þ=
@x1j < 1 where riðxjÞ is the best reply of i to j (see, e.g. Fudenberg and Tirole,
1991). The equilibrium at point O and the one at point E are stable, while the one
at point U is unstable. Equilibrium values at U are calculated using (A1) and (A2).
Denoting the implied symmetric innovation levels by x15xDD and x25xDD, we
have:
xDD52t2A: (A4)
(Note that this is positive when t 2 ~t; t^½  since we then have t > A=2.)
Proof of Proposition 1
We begin with part (iii), where trade costs lie between ~t and t^ ð~t  t  t^Þ (see Figure
2a). In this range of trade costs there are three equilibria: given that firm j sets
xj5x00, firm i’s best response is x00. Hence, autarky is an equilibrium. However,
given that firm j invests xEEðtÞ, firm i’s best response is xEEðtÞ and exports are posi-
tive at the symmetric investment level xEEðtÞ with t < t^. Hence, the symmetric two-
way trade equilibrium with ðx1; x2Þ5ðxEE; xEEÞ is an equilibrium too. Define x15x25
xDD as the symmetric innovation level at which the q150 and the q250 intersect.
Given that firm j sets xDD; the best response of firm i is also xDD. Hence, the sym-
metric equilibrium outcome with ðx1; x2Þ5ðxDD; xDDÞ, implying that each firm deters
its rival from its domestic market, is the third equilibrium.
(i) For t < ~t, autarky cannot prevail. The autarky section of the reaction functions
does not exist for t < ~t since for this range of trade costs the threshold x
2
is no lon-
ger below x
2
. The reaction functions intersect only once at E (see Figure 2c). Given
that firm j invests xEEðtÞ, firm i’s best response is xEEðtÞ and exports are positive at
the unique symmetric investment level xEEðtÞ.
(ii) For t > t^, there is no trade. The REE1 ðx2Þ and REE2 ðx1Þ sections of the reaction
functions do not exist for t > t^. The reaction functions intersect only once at O (see
Figure 2b). Given that firm j sets innovation level xj5x00, firm i’s best response is
x00 and autarky prevails as the unique equilibrium. w
Derivation of Results in Table 1
The two-way trade symmetric equilibrium investment level when investment is cho-
sen before output is given in (17) while the corresponding expression in the
simultaneous-move game is given by (20). A comparison of these two expressions
yields Result 1 in Table 1. These two expressions can be written in compact form as:
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xðrÞ5rg 2A2t
322rg
; (A5)
where r54=3 when investment is chosen before outputs and r51 in the
simultaneous-move game. (Thus (17) and (20) are special cases of (A5).) The
parameter r, which captures the strategic aggressiveness of investment, is the only
parameter that differs between the two games. The use of (A5) in the expressions
for (4) and (5) yields:
q1ðrÞ5q2ðrÞ5
A1tð12rgÞ
322rg
(A6)
and
q2ðrÞ5q1ðrÞ5
A2tð22rgÞ
322rg
: (A7)
The use of these in expression (2) for profits yields the following general
expression for profits in symmetric two-way trade: pðrÞ5 12r2gð322rgÞ2 2AðA2tÞ½
1ð1=2Þt21ð1=2Þt2. It is straightforward to show that this is smaller at r54=3 when
investment is chosen before outputs than at r51 in the simultaneous-move game.
This is Result 2 in Table 1. The use of (A6) and (A7) in the expression for con-
sumer surplus yields: CSðrÞ5 ð2A2tÞ=ð322rgÞ½ 2=2. It is easy to see that this is
increasing in r, giving Result 3. Combining the expressions for profits and con-
sumer surplus, we get
WðrÞ5 22r
2g
ð322rgÞ2 2AðA2tÞ1ð1=2Þt
2
 
1ð1=2Þt2: (A8)
It is straightforward to show that this is larger at r54=3 than at r51, yielding
Result 4 in Table 1.
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Notes
1. Like d’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988), we model process R&D as a continuous variable
and assume firms are ex ante symmetric. In a paper that is—in spirit—akin to ours, Ferrett (2006)
discusses the welfare effects of R&D investment with a leader and a laggard firm, but does so in a
closed-economy set-up in which R&D is a discrete variable. While our paper builds on the trade
model of Brander and Krugman (1983), his paper builds on the closed-economy model of Lahiri
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and Ono (1988), which had no R&D. However, besides the fact that that paper deals with a
closed economy and our paper considers trade and trade liberalization, other important differen-
ces exist, which makes the two works quite distinct.
2. For a survey on the literature onmodels of reciprocal markets, see Leahy andNeary (2011).
3. Clarke and Collie (2003) examine the welfare effects of free trade in a RM model under Ber-
trand duopoly with differentiated products and show that, in that set-up, there are always gains
from trade.
4. Some empirical studies suggest that the typical firm improves its productivity performance in
response to lower trade costs (see, e.g. Krishna and Mitra, 1998; Pavcnik, 2002; Amiti and Kon-
ings, 2007; Fernandes, 2007). In a country-specific study, looking at the Colombian experience
with trade liberalization, Ederington andMcCalman (2007) found that more liberal trade tended
to raise productivity of the typical firm in industries with low barriers to entry, small technology
gaps, large markets and large initial levels of protection. Bustos (2010) established that trade lib-
eralization raises the incentive of exporters to adopt a more advanced technology. By contrast,
Trefler (2004) finds that a reduction in domestic tariffs has no significant impact on firm
productivity.
5. To ensure tractability of our model, we abstract from the firm selection effect of trade liberali-
zation on R&D, which Van Long et al. (2011) focus on.
6. The extension to differentiated products is straightforward but adds nothing to the analysis
other than extra notation.
7. Market segmentation is a key assumption in RM type models and implies no resale between
markets so that, in principle, market prices could differ internationally.
8. Naturally, this has welfare implications as there will not be any tariff revenues to be returned
to consumers. Including tariff revenues would actually strengthen the gains from trade
liberalization.
9. This terminology, now often used in the related literature, was introduced by Leahy and
Neary (1997).
10. Following Fudenberg and Tirole (1984) and Tirole (1988), we refer to choosing investment
above the cost-minimizing level to influence the rival’s output choice as choosing investment
“strategically.”
11. To ensure stability in all cases we restrict g to be less than 0.375.
12. Although it is never observed as an equilibrium under symmetry, it is necessary to derive the
reaction functions.
13. Note that, if firms were able to choose not only how much but also when to invest in R&D,
each firm would choose to invest early (i.e. before outputs are chosen), rather than late (i.e.
simultaneously to output decisions), irrespective of the investment-timing decision of the rival. If
its rival chooses to invest early, the firm also wants to invest early to avoid having a second-
mover disadavantage of investing in R&D after its rival. If its rival decides to delay investing, the
firm will wants to invest early to benefit from a first-mover advantage. This implies that, without
uncertainty, each firmwould choose to pre-commit to investment prior to making its output deci-
sions. For a more detailed discussion of endogenous investment timing in oligopoly games with
and without uncertainty, see Dewit and Leahy (2006).
14. This is consistent with Aghion et al. (2005) who examined the relationship between product
market competition and innovation and found strong evidence of an inverted-U relationship.
15. For a detailed treatment of asymmetries, we refer to our working paper, which is download-
able from http://eprints.maynoothuniversity.ie/5687/.
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